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475 
KIMBROUGH, SPEARS, AND CATEGORICAL 
REJECTION: THE LATEST ADDITIONS TO THE 
FAMILY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 
CASES 
In the past three decades, the federal sentencing system has been in a 
state of flux.
1
 At the core of the debate, and at issue in a great deal of 
modern cases, is how much discretion federal judges ought to have when 
sentencing defendants.
2
 The amount of discretion committed to judges 
depends largely on how the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(―Sentencing Guidelines‖ or ―the Guidelines‖) are construed. In Spears v. 
United States,
3
 the Supreme Court sought to clarify the role of the 
Sentencing Guidelines under the post–United States v. Booker4 advisory 
sentencing scheme. Spears held that judges may categorically reject the 
Guidelines pertaining to powder-to-crack cocaine ratios. In the wake of 
this holding, significant questions about the role of the Sentencing 
Guidelines persist. Of particular importance are questions about when 
judges may categorically reject the Sentencing Guidelines outside of the 
crack cocaine context.
5
 
In order to put the Supreme Court‘s recent federal sentencing decisions 
and the modern debate from which they stem in proper context, this Note 
will begin, in Part I, with a discussion of the history of federal sentencing, 
including the pre–Sentencing Guideline era and the origination of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. This section will also address the various 
criticisms the Sentencing Guidelines have attracted and how their role has 
evolved accordingly. Part II will analyze the Spears decision and the 
associated case law. Part III will examine the way federal district courts 
are currently construing Spears, with an eye for the meaningful 
constructive uncertainties such courts are grappling with and on which 
they are diverging. Finally, in Part IV, this Note will seek to suggest the 
most fruitful treatment of Spears, concluding that judges should practice 
 
 
 1. See infra notes 5, 6, 14, 23, 42, 43 and accompanying text.  
 2. See, e.g., Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009); Kimbrough v. United States, 
128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).  
 3. Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 842.  
 4. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. 
 5. This is a question of great social and judicial import following the Spears decision. ―The 
question we confront here is whether the authority recognized in Spears to reject on policy grounds an 
otherwise-applicable aspect of the Sentencing Guidelines is limited to the crack cocaine context.‖ 
United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 583–84 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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categorical rejection only in limited circumstances and that sentencing 
opinions should accompany all instances of categorical rejection.  
I. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 
A. Origin of the United States Sentencing Commission and the Birth of the 
Guidelines 
Congressional creation of the United States Sentencing Commission
6
 
(―the Commission‖) and the subsequent implementation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines
7
 reflected a belief that federal sentencing was misaligned with 
national values.
8
 By enacting the Guidelines, Congress sought to express 
modern national sentencing values and mandate their application in the 
federal courts.
9
  
The undesirable condition of federal sentencing preceding the 1980s 
prompted Congress to take action in the realm of federal sentencing.
10
 At 
this juncture, the federal system was an ―indeterminate sentencing 
 
 
 6.  
The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch of 
government. Its principle purposes are: (1) to establish sentencing policies and practices for 
the federal courts, including guidelines to be consulted regarding the appropriate form and 
severity of punishment for offenders convicted of federal crimes; (2) to advise and assist 
Congress and the executive branch in the development of effective and efficient crime policy; 
and (3) to collect, analyze, research, and distribute a broad array of information on federal 
crime and sentencing issues . . . . 
OFFICE OF PUBL‘G & PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED 
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2009) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N OVERVIEW]. 
 7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2009). 
 8. Author Frank O. Bowman illustrated: 
In the 1970s and 1980s, [the indeterminate model of sentencing that relied on the discretion of 
district court judges] fell into increasing disfavor in state and federal courts . . . . Critics 
doubted the claims of both judges and parole boards to special sentencing expertise, and 
many called for ‗truth in sentencing,‘ by which they meant assurance that defendants would 
really serve all or most of the sentence imposed . . . . [This] produced the SRA, and three 
years later, the federal sentencing guidelines.  
Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1322–23 (2005). 
 9. The U.S. Sentencing Commission explained: 
After more than a decade of research and debate, Congress decided that (1) the previously 
unfettered sentencing discretion afforded federal trial judges needed to be structured; (2) the 
administration of punishment needed to be more certain; and (3) specific offenders . . . needed 
to be targeted for more serious penalties. Consequently, Congress created a permanent 
commission charged with formulating national sentencing guidelines . . . .  
U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
 10. Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After Booker, 62 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1115, 1120 (2008). 
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regime,‖ supplemented by the parole system.11 Under this dual system, 
judges and parole officers alike made individualized assessments of a 
given offender‘s blameworthiness and potential for rehabilitation.12 Such 
assessments, in all of their broad discretion, were practically invulnerable 
to appellate review because appellate courts pledged great deference to the 
sentencing judge‘s relatively superior familiarity with the facts in a given 
case.
13
 Consequently, district court judges possessed nearly limitless 
discretion to sentence federal offenders,
14
 with their unilateral sentencing 
judgments curtailed only by the occasional presence of an applicable 
statutory minimum or maximum.
15
 These judges applied the lowest 
standard of proof known to the criminal justice system in sentencing 
hearings, and evidentiary safeguards were conspicuously absent.
16
 As a 
result, similarly situated perpetrators received highly disparate sentences 
for the same or similar crimes.
17
 These troubling inconsistencies turned 
out to be one of the fatal flaws of the indeterminate sentencing scheme; 
 
 
 11. Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. 261, 263 (2009); 
see also Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938). 
 12. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).  
 13. Mistretta explained: 
This [indeterminate sentencing regime] led almost inevitably to the conclusion on the part of 
a reviewing court that the sentencing judge ‗sees more and senses more‘ than the appellate 
court; thus, the judge enjoyed the ‗superiority of his nether position,‘ for that court's 
determination as to what sentence was appropriate met with virtually unconditional deference 
on appeal.  
Id. at 364; see also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A 
Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1445 (1997):  
[T]rial judges were given discretion to fix any penalty within the ceiling provided by the 
statutory maximum. . . . [J]udges were instructed to consult any and all factors having to do 
with the crime itself or the offender . . . . With such a free-form thought process in gear, there 
were effectively no legal principles against which a sentence could be tested on review. 
 14. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 1 (―Before guidelines were 
developed, judges could give a defendant a sentence that ranged anywhere from probation to the 
maximum penalty for the offense.‖). 
 15. Harrison, supra note 10, at 1120; see also Gertner, supra note 11, at 261 (volume and 
severity of statutory minimums and maximums were on the rise by the 1980s largely due to 
widespread political pressure to crack down on crime, which Congress responded to, in part, by 
arbitrarily increasing sentences via statute). 
 16. Gertner, supra note 11, at 263 (―Trials safeguarded rights with strict evidentiary rules and the 
demanding standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, sentencing hearings were 
conducted without regard to the rules of evidence and with the lowest standard of proof in the criminal 
justice system, a fair preponderance of the evidence.‖). 
 17. Under the pre-Guidelines‘ ―indeterminate sentencing system, the judge sentences a defendant 
. . . but the number of years the defendant actually serves is determined later by an administrative body 
like a parole board.‖ Bowman, supra note 8, at 1321–22. Having both a judge and an administrative 
body participate in sentencing exacerbated the problem of inconsistency in the sentences of those 
convicted of federal crimes.  
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they were key factors prompting the passage of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 (SRA).
18
  
Congress passed the SRA as a component of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act.
19
 In turn, the SRA created the Sentencing Commission to 
serve as an independent judicial agency
20
 charged with the tasks of first 
promulgating and then providing oversight for the new system of federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.
21
 The expectation was that the role played by the 
Commission, and the Guidelines they would promulgate, would together 
remedy the problems that had plagued the historically indeterminate 
sentencing regime.
22
 Supporters hoped that the Commission might prove 
successful at this task by virtue of the fact that it was independent from the 
political process and could therefore review and contemplate sentencing 
from a dispassionate and autonomous vantage point.
23
 Hope for the 
Commission‘s success was also pinned upon the fact that they would 
employ empirical data and expertise about sentencing that judges often 
lacked.
24
  
 
 
 18. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837; see Gertner, supra note 11, at 264; 
see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 41–46 (1983) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that indeterminate sentencing had 
disturbing consequences, namely, variations in judicial sentences and uncertainty as to the amount of 
time a given offender would spend in prison); Daniel A. Chatham, Playing with Post-Booker Fire: The 
Danger of Increased Judicial Discretion in Federal White Collar Sentencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619, 621 
(2007) (―This judicial discretion led to disparity in the sentences of similarly situated offenders, a 
problem decried by both Democrats and Republicans in Congress . . . .‖); Harrison, supra note 10, at 
1120.  
 19. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976; see also Chatham, 
supra note 18, at 621.  
 20. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, supra note 6, at 3.The commission consists of seven voting 
members who serve six-year terms. Id. The commissioners must be appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. Id. The rules mandate that at least three of the seven commissioners must be 
federal judges. Bipartisanship is ensured by the fact that no more than four commissioners may belong 
to the same political party. Id.  
 21. See Chatham, supra note 18, at 621; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006) (explaining that 
Congress established ―an independent commission in the judicial branch‖ to develop ―sentencing 
policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system‖).  
 22. ―The sentencing guidelines were intended most importantly to curtail judicial and Parole 
Commission discretion, which was viewed as ‗arbitrary and capricious‘ and an ineffective deterrent to 
crime.‖ U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, INTRODUCTION TO THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT 2 (2004) 
(citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 65 (1984)). 
 23. See Gertner, supra note 11, at 265 (―Congressmen from both sides of the aisle hoped that the 
Commission would be more successful than Congress had been in appropriately punishing the ‗crime 
du jour,‘ by dispassionately reviewing sentences rather than responding impulsively.‖).  
 24. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (2006) (charging the Commission with the task of 
developing Guidelines that will ―reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of 
human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process‖); 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006) (requiring the 
Commission to ―consult with authorities on, and individual and institutional representatives of, various 
aspects of the Federal criminal justice system‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/4
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In 1987, the Commission issued the first version of the mandatory 
federal Sentencing Guidelines.
25
 But significant legal obstacles followed 
on the heels of this acheivement, for suspicion about the legal legitimacy 
of the Guidelines was afoot from the time of their inception.  
In Mistretta v. United States,
26
 the Supreme Court confronted its first 
opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the SRA and the 
Sentencing Guidelines. The petitioner contended that the SRA was an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to another branch of 
government in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers and the related nondelegation doctrine.
27
 Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court stood in support of the SRA, finding Congress‘s delegation of 
power through the SRA sufficiently specific and therefore within 
Congress‘s permissible ambit of delegation.28 Fortified by the Court‘s 
rejection of the constitutional challenges to the SRA and the Commission, 
Congress enacted the Guidelines nationally in January of 1989.
29
 Under 
the new Guidelines-based regime, federal sentencing was a transformed 
concept. The Guidelines shifted the power balance in sentencing, 
significantly scaling back judicial discretion. Furthermore, individual 
sentences became largely the product of mathematical calculations
30
 
devoid of the personal judgment and instinct that had characterized the old 
system.
31
  
The new power distribution was cemented by § 3553(b)(1) of the 
United States Code, which explicitly affirmed the mandatory quality of the 
 
 
 25. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, 
CHAPTER 1: COMMISSION OVERVIEW 1, available at www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/ar08toc.htm. 
 26. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). 
 27. Id. at 370. ―The Constitution provides that ‗[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States.‘‖ Id. at 371 (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1). This provision 
has historically been read to mean that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative powers. 
However, as the Court explained in Mistretta, ―the nondelegation doctrine . . . do[es] not prevent 
Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches.‖ Id. at 372.  
 28. Id. at 374–76 (noting that ―we harbor no doubt that Congress‘ delegation of authority to the 
Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements‖ and 
citing the litany of goals, purposes, and requirements that Congress imposed on the Commission via 
the SRA). 
 29. Timothy B. McGrath, A Fraud is a Fraud, but Bankruptcy Fraud is Inherently Bad: 
Enhanced Sentencing, 28-4 AM. BANKR. INST. J 1, 58 (May 2009).  
 30. The two primary factors in calculating a given sentence are (1) seriousness of the offense and 
(2) the defendant‘s previous criminal history, or lack thereof. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2004). 
 31. Harrison, supra note 10, at 1120; see also Chatham, supra note 18, at 623 (―Many federal 
judges abhorred the new strictures on their sentencing discretion and expressed outrage with the 
Guidelines . . . .‖). 
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Guidelines.
32
 While the Guidelines allowed judges to grant downward 
departures
33
 for a defendant‘s mere ―substantial assistance‖34 or ―an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance . . . of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration . . . in formulating the Guidelines,‖35 
the appellate review provisions of the Guidelines discouraged judges from 
doing so.
36
 The appellate review provisions permitted a dissatisfied 
prosecutor
37
 to appeal a judge‘s application of the Guidelines, which often 
resulted in reversal of downward departures by the appellate courts
38—
something all judges seek to avoid. 
B. The Unique Institutional Role of the Guidelines 
From the time of their origin, the Guidelines were designed to, and did 
in fact, serve a unique institutional role. Because the Commission was 
intended to remedy the flaws in the previous sentencing regime and not 
just codify existing sentencing trends, it was apparent that it must adopt a 
 
 
 32.  
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within 
the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result 
in a sentence different from that described. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 33. A ―downward departure‖ is a sentence that departs from the prescribed Guidelines range, 
offering a lesser sentence instead. A downward departure may be granted in the case of a plea 
agreement or when the defendant offers substantial assistance to the government with another 
investigation or prosecution. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 829 (2009).  
 34. See Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 24–25 (1999) (explaining that if a defendant 
offers his assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another criminal, this may constitute 
substantial assistance; upon government‘s request, the court may reduce such defendant‘s sentence on 
the basis of substantial assistance); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2010) 
(allowing Government to move for downward departure based on defendant‘s ―substantial 
assistance‖). 
 35. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2010). This provision permits judicial 
discretion to adjust a sentence when extrastatutory factors had a role in the crime or the defendant‘s 
life. To illustrate, the court in United States v. Stewart found that the defendant‘s ―obstruction of 
justice, her abuse of trust, and her false statements to the government‖ were ―aggravating 
circumstances.‖ 590 F.3d 93, 185 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006); see also Susan R. Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ’s 
Attack on Federal Judicial “Leniency,” the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Criminal 
Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519, 525 (2009). 
 37. I specify the prosecutor because the access to review was not symmetrical. Defendants could 
not appeal a sentencing judge‘s refusal to grant them a downward departure that they thought was 
warranted under their circumstances because appellate courts did not have jurisdiction to review the 
discretionary decision not to grant a downward departure. See United States v. Gendraw, 337 F.3d 70, 
71 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that the court of appeals had no authority to review the district court‘s 
denial of downward departure). 
 38. See Klein & Thompson, supra note 36, at 525. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/4
  
 
 
 
 
2010] KIMBROUGH, SPEARS, AND CATEGORICAL REJECTION 481 
 
 
 
 
different approach to sentencing than that previously employed by 
judges.
39
 Hence, in its development of the Guidelines, the Commission 
used an empirical approach to sentencing, informed by data and past 
sentencing practices.
40
 To ensure that the Guidelines maintain an empirical 
approach, the SRA required the Commission to conduct ongoing crime 
policy research, consult commentary from participants and experts in the 
field, and periodically adapt the Guidelines to reflect changing data.
41
 The 
Commission also distinguished the new Guidelines by explicitly setting 
forth four purposes of sentencing: just punishment, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
42
 The Guidelines were committed to 
implementing these purposes of sentencing in a dispassionate and 
reasoned fashion.
43
 Accordingly, the unique empirical approach and the 
commitment to effectuating the various purposes of punishment allow the 
Guidelines to be characterized as having a distinct institutional role.  
All of the Guidelines promulgated by the Commission are intended to 
be a product of this distinct institutional role, but, unfortunately, some 
Guidelines are not. At times, the Commission has deviated from its 
intended role and implemented Guidelines that were influenced by social 
pressure, popular politics, or other nonempirical factors.
44
 The 100:1 
powder-to-crack cocaine drug quantity ratio established by Guideline 
2D1.1 is one illustration of this problematic phenomenon.
45
 Not only does 
this shirk the empirical approach, but it corrupts the principle that the 
 
 
 39. See Gertner, supra note 11, at 265. 
 40. See United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638 (N.D. Iowa 2009). The data about past 
sentencing practices that the Commission would use included 10,000 presentence investigation reports. 
See also Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 566–68 (2007). The Commission was charged 
with ―modifying and adjusting past practice in the interests of greater rationality, avoiding 
inconsistency, [and] complying with congressional instructions.‖ Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 
2456, 2464 (2007). 
 41. See 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(8), (9), (12)(A), (13)–(16), (20), (21) (2006); see also Rita, 127 S. Ct. 
at 2464; Bowman, supra note 8, at 1319 (―[T]he Sentencing Commission was intended to gather 
feedback about how the system worked and serve[d] as an authoritative (though not final) body of 
neutral experts who would translate the feedback into sensible revisions of the rules.‖); Gertner, supra 
note 11, at 265. 
 42. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N OVERVIEW, supra note 6.  
 43. See Gertner, supra note 11, at 265 (―The sentencing guidelines were supposed . . . to 
implement all the purposes of punishment, including deterrence and rehabilitation. In addition, the 
Commission was to rationalize punishments across offense categories, using the philosophy of limited 
retribution.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 44. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 566–68 (explaining that the Commission deviated from its prior 
empirical approach when formulating the Sentencing Guidelines for ―drug-trafficking offenses‖). 
 45. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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identified purposes of punishment should be effected in a dispassionate 
way.
46
 
C. The 100:1 Powder-to-Crack Cocaine Ratio: A Guideline Enacted 
Outside of the Commission’s Unique Institutional Role 
There is a broad consensus that in developing the Guidelines related to 
drug-trafficking offenses, the Commission acted outside the scope of its 
characteristic institutional role.
47
 Instead of utilizing data about past 
sentencing practices and considering the purposes of punishment as 
intended, the Commission relied on the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act‘s 
weight, or quantity-driven, scheme to promulgate the drug-trafficking 
Guidelines.
48
 By relying exclusively on this scheme, the Commission 
neglected to accord the proper weight to empirical factors and the 
purposes of punishment.  
Borrowing from the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the Commission 
implemented a 100:1 powder-to-crack cocaine ratio under which courts 
would sentence drug offenders.
49
 Practically speaking, the adoption of this 
ratio meant that possession of one unit of crack cocaine received the same 
treatment as possession of one hundred units of powder cocaine for the 
 
 
 46. Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Troubling 
Silence on the Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2003) (developing ―an 
independent and dispassionate approach to sentencing policy‖ was a primary goal espoused in the 
SRA).  
 47. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 566–68; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 91 (2002) (stating that the crack guideline 
―fails to meet the sentencing objectives set forth by Congress . . . .‖). 
 48. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. This is the origin of the 
federal criminal law distinction of crack cocaine as a substance to be treated more severely by the law 
than powder cocaine. The Sentencing Guidelines derived the 100:1 ratio from this Act‘s treatment of 
500 grams of powder cocaine and 5 grams of crack cocaine as triggering the same five-year penalty.  
Congress‘s conclusions about the dangerousness of crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine 
flowed from specific assumptions. First, crack cocaine was viewed as extraordinarily 
addictive. . . . Second, the correlation between crack cocaine use and the commission of other 
serious crimes was considered greater than that with other drugs. Floor statements focused on 
psychopharmacologically driven, economically compulsive, as well as systemic crime . . . . 
Third, the physiological effects of crack cocaine were considered especially perilous, leading 
to psychosis and death. 
U.S. Sentencing Comm‘n, Report on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 118 (2005) [hereinafter 
Report on Cocaine]. 
 49. See John G. Wheatley, Note, United States v. Pho: Defining the Limits of Discretionary 
Sentencing, 59 ME. L. REV. 213, 217 (2007). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act originated the federal criminal 
law distinction between ―cocaine base‖ and other forms of the drug. The legislative distinction 
between crack and powder cocaine was deliberate, not accidental. See REPORT ON COCAINE, supra 
note 48. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/4
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purposes of calculating a federal sentence.
50
 The assumptions inherent in 
the ratio about the relative harmfulness of crack versus powder cocaine are 
plainly refuted by modern research and scientific data, representing a 
frustration of the empirical component of the Commission‘s institutional 
role.
51
 The 100:1 ratio also fails to serve the Commission‘s institutional 
purpose because it punishes low-level crack traffickers more harshly than 
major powder cocaine traffickers and has a disproportionate impact on 
black offenders.
52
 As the district court noted in United States v. Gully, 
―that ratio is the result of congressional mandates that interfere with and 
undermine the work of the Sentencing Commission.‖53 The historical 
record indicates that this wildly lopsided ratio can be attributed to the 
popular hysteria stemming from fear and ignorance about crack cocaine in 
the 1980s.
54
  
By the mid-1980s, Congress perceived the American drug problem to 
be of great proportions, even deeming it an epidemic.
55
 Crack cocaine was 
at the forefront of that epidemic.
56
 During this era, the public viewed crack 
as extraordinarily dangerous and particularly addictive.
57
 In 1986, when 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed, the public and media concern about 
crack cocaine was fervent, thereby fueling Congress‘s inclination to come 
down hard on crack offenders.
58
 The unfortunate result of this climate was 
that the Commission stepped out of its characteristic institutional role for 
the promulgation of the crack cocaine offender Guideline, leaving courts 
with an unfounded and racially charged ratio that has been the subject of 
grave criticism, even from the Commission itself.
59
 
 
 
 50. See Wheatley, supra note 49, at 217. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 102–03 (2002) (reporting that approximately 85% of federal court 
defendants who are convicted of crack offenses are black, resulting in the disturbing fact that the 
severe crack sentences mandated by the 100:1 ratio are suffered almost entirely by black defendants). 
 53. United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 641 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
 54. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 55. The legislative history of the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act indicates, mainly via statements 
from individual legislators, that Congress viewed the drug problem as a national ―epidemic‖ during 
this era. See REPORT ON COCAINE, supra note 48, at 117. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 118. 
 58. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 567 (2007) (―Crack cocaine was a relatively 
new drug when the 1986 Act was signed into law, but it was already a matter of great public concern 
. . . .‖).  
 59. See Steven L. Chanenson, Statement of Steven L. Chanenson Before the United States 
Sentencing Commission Regarding Retroactivity of Crack Guidelines Amendments, 20 FED. SENT‘G 
REP. 75, 146 (2007). The Commission issued reports about crack cocaine sentencing in 1995, 1997, 
2002, and 2007. In each report, the Commission repeated its finding that the 100:1 quantity ratio is 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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D. The Booker Era and its Blow to the Mandatory Sentencing Scheme 
The Supreme Court‘s 2005 decision in United States v. Booker 
effectively tore down the mandatory sentencing scheme that had taken root 
with the initiation of the Sentencing Guidelines in the late 1980s.
60
 
Following Booker, little was clear in the realm of federal sentencing, for 
the contours of the new sentencing framework had not sufficiently 
emerged. Conflicting views developed among judges about how to 
negotiate their newfound leeway and how to define the relationship 
between the Guidelines and judicial discretion post-Booker.
61
 
Booker came to the Supreme Court on the coattails of an earlier 
sentencing decision, Apprendi v. New Jersey.
62
 Apprendi held that ―any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.‖63 Blakely v. Washington,64 an intermediary of Apprendi and 
Booker, further raised the question: how, if at all, could the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial interact with the Sentencing Guidelines?
65
 
Booker sought to resolve this problem.  
The Booker controversy stemmed from a factual scenario in which the 
defendant, Freddie Booker, was charged with possession with intent to 
distribute a minimum of 50 grams of crack.
66
 Under the Sentencing 
 
 
inappropriate in light of scientific data about the relative harms associated with crack-versus-powder 
cocaine. All four reports have emphasized that adherence to the principles set forth in the SRA require 
amendment of the sentencing rules affecting crack offenders. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, SPECIAL 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 153–54 (1995); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM‘N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING 
POLICY 9–10 (1997); U. S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 91 (2002); U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: 
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 6–9 (2007). 
 60. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005). 
 61. ―Conflicting lower court opinions document that few judges or practitioners are sure whether 
Booker significantly changed or only slightly altered the operational realities of the federal sentencing 
system.‖ Douglas A. Berman, How Should the Courts of Appeals Judge Whether a Federal Sentence 
Outside the Sentencing Guidelines is “Reasonable”?, 35 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 24, 25 (2007). 
 62. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 63. Id. at 490 (noting that the fact of a prior conviction was excepted from the requirement that 
facts increasing the penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury).  
 64. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Blakely was decided just one year before Booker. The Court held that 
the government‘s failure to ―prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment‖ was a 
violation of defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Id. at 313. 
 65. ―[W]e are not, as the State would have it, ‗find[ing] determinate sentencing schemes 
unconstitutional.‘ This case is not about whether determinate sentencing is constitutional, only about 
how it can be implemented in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment.‖ Id. at 308 (citations 
omitted). 
 66. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/4
  
 
 
 
 
2010] KIMBROUGH, SPEARS, AND CATEGORICAL REJECTION 485 
 
 
 
 
Guidelines, the defendant‘s criminal history and the quantity of drugs 
found by the jury mandated the imposition of a sentence not less than 201 
nor greater than 262 months‘ incarceration.67 Yet in the posttrial 
sentencing hearing, the district court judge concluded by the applicable 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that the defendant had actually 
been in possession of an additional 566 grams of crack, far more than the 
jury had found, and that he was also guilty of obstruction of justice.
68
 
Based on these findings at sentencing, the Guidelines required a sentence 
of no less than 360 months‘ and no greater than life imprisonment.69  
It was not until Booker that the Supreme Court condemned this brand 
of judicial fact finding. But Freddie Booker‘s experience in the federal 
court system was not unique; many other federal defendants suffered a 
similar experience with judicial fact finding.
70
 Beginning in the mid-
1980s, legislative regulation of federal sentencing encouraged factual 
determinations that had the effect of increasing the range of sentencing to 
be imposed for a given crime.
71
 The consequence of this trend was the 
augmentation of judicial sentencing power at the cost of the power 
historically and constitutionally allocated to the jury.
72
 This trend had 
problematic implications for the substantive—though not procedural—
guarantee of a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, for in pre-Booker 
cases, the fact finding pertinent to sentencing often functionally ceased to 
be the purview of the jury.
73
 
In Booker, the Supreme Court responded forcefully to the divisive 
Sixth Amendment problems that developed under the mandatory 
 
 
 67. The jury heard evidence that Booker actually possessed 92.5 grams of crack in his duffel bag 
and therefore found him guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). Id.; see also U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(c)(4), 4A1.1 (2004). 
 68. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.  
 69. Id. The outcome for the defendant was that ―instead of the sentence of 21 years and 10 
months that the judge could have imposed on the basis of the facts proved to the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Booker received a 30–year sentence.‖ Id. 
 70. Booker, 543 U.S. at 236 (―American judges commonly determined facts justifying a choice 
of a heavier sentence on account of the manner in which particular defendants acted.‖). 
 71. Legislative sentencing enhancements of this nature were an outgrowth of the legislature‘s 
concern about the increase of drug crimes during the 1980s, many of which were associated with 
violent crimes. Id. at 236.  
 72. The Booker opinion explained: 
The effect of the increasing emphasis on facts that enhanced sentencing ranges . . . was to 
increase the judge‘s power and diminish that of the jury. It became the judge, not the jury, 
who determined the upper limits of sentencing, and the facts determined were not required to 
be raised before trial or proved by more than a preponderance. 
Id.  
 73. Id. at 237. 
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Guidelines scheme.
74
 The Court held that the imposition of an enhanced 
sentence under the Guidelines based on findings of fact made by the 
sentencing judge and not the jury was a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.
75
 Having arrived at this conclusion, the Court next 
considered the appropriate remedy for the situation. The Court answered 
this question by ―finding the provision of the federal sentencing statute 
that makes the Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. IV), 
incompatible with today‘s constitutional holding.‖76 Ultimately, the Court 
concluded that this provision must be ―severed and excised‖ from the 
Guidelines.
77
  
Pursuant to the Booker decision, the SRA suddenly made the 
Guidelines ―effectively advisory,‖ instead of mandatory.78 The Court‘s 
decision to make the Guidelines advisory necessarily forced them to 
address the related issue of appellate review of sentencing conducted 
under the new scheme. On this question, the Court concluded that 
reviewing courts should henceforth apply a standard of reasonableness.
79
 
Practically, this has translated into varying grades of proportionality 
review among circuit courts reviewing sentences.
80
 Having established 
what courts constitutionally could not do in terms of sentencing, the Court 
 
 
 74. The Court‘s opinion was divided into two primary parts. The first was authored by Justice 
Stevens, who discussed the merits of the constitutional arguments at play and found the Guidelines 
unconstitutional as written. The second portion of the opinion was written by Justice Breyer. He 
addressed the remedial issues by severing the problematic portions of the Guidelines but retaining the 
rest. Klein & Thompson, supra note 36, at 542–43. Justice Breyer‘s stance in the opinion may have 
been influenced by his professional history: he was one of the original members of the Sentencing 
Commission that devised the first Guidelines. Id. Perhaps this explains, at least partially, Justice 
Breyer‘s track record of voting to preserve the Guidelines. Id. at 537. 
 75. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. 
 76. Id. at 245. The Court also excised one other statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000 & 
Supp. IV), because it necessarily depended on the mandatory status of the Guidelines. This statute set 
forth the standard of appellate review requiring courts of appeals to determine whether a sentence was 
―a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines‖ or was ―outside the applicable 
guideline range.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000).  
 77. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
 78. Id. 
 79. The Booker Court opined: 
[A] statute that does not explicitly set forth a standard of review may nonetheless do so 
implicitly. . . . We infer appropriate review standards from related statutory language, the 
structure of the statute, and the ―sound administration of justice.‖ And in this instance those 
factors . . . imply a practical standard of review already familiar to the appellate courts: 
review for unreasonable[ness].  
Booker, 543 U.S. at 260–61 (citations omitted); see also Crosby v. United States, 397 F.3d 103, 114–
16 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the content of reasonableness review); Harrison, supra note 10, at 1124 
(noting that appellate courts have applied a reasonableness standard of review in past sentencing cases 
involving review of departures and sentences imposed in the absence of an applicable Guideline).  
 80. See Berman, supra note 61, at 25.  
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briefly addressed the lingering question of how, in fact, judges should 
conduct sentencing. The Court stated that ―[w]ithout the ‗mandatory‘ 
provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the 
Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.‖81 Despite this vague 
statement that might fairly be termed a hint to district courts about how 
they should approach future sentencing, Booker can be understood as a 
what-not-to-do case. The opinion left a great deal of questions open and 
relegated the task of developing a coherent advisory sentencing regime to 
the lower federal courts.
82
 
Under the newly instituted system in which the Guidelines are merely 
advisory, it was inevitable, and permissible, that a significant degree of 
judicial discretion would reemerge in sentencing. From this discretion, 
circuits split about how to apply the advisory Guidelines, and sentencing 
disparities across courts and regions naturally followed. These 
consequences were unavoidable under the new regime in which judges 
were only tethered to the Guidelines by a mandate to ―consider‖ them and 
remain loyal to the broad policy considerations espoused in § 3553(a).
83
  
Notably, the circuits came to differing answers regarding the question 
of whether sentences within the Guidelines deserved a presumption of 
reasonableness.
84
 The Supreme Court stepped in to resolve this split in 
Rita v. United States,
85
 holding that the law allows, but does not require, a 
presumption of reasonableness to be applied on appeal to a within-
Guidelines sentence.
86
 The circuits also split on the issue of whether post-
 
 
 81. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. The Court indicated what constitute the other sentencing goals 
when it noted that judges should take account of: the pertinent Guideline sentencing range, the policy 
statements of the Commission, the need to avoid unjustified sentencing disparities, the interest in 
supplying restitution to victims of crime, promotion of respect for the law, and deterrence. Id. at 259–
60. 
 82. See Berman, supra note 61, at 25. ―Federal judges have struggled to comprehend the 
meaning and impact of . . . United States v. Booker . . . . Conflicting lower court opinions document 
that few judges or practitioners are sure whether Booker significantly changed or only slightly altered 
the operational realities of the federal sentencing system.‖ Id.  
 83. ―After Booker made the Guidelines advisory . . . sentencing disparities were inevitable. 
District courts were made free to vary from the Guidelines or sentence within the Guidelines range, so 
long as the sentence itself was reasonable and grounded in the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a).‖ Harrison, supra note 10, at 1116.  
 84. See Harrison, supra note 10, at 1129 (―The D.C., Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits all have elected to presume a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable, 
while the First, Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits have chosen not to apply such a presumption.‖). 
 85. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
 86. Id. at 2462 . The petitioner was convicted of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false 
statements. He sought a sentence lower than the recommended Guidelines range based on his likely 
vulnerability in prison, ―poor physical condition,‖ and past military service, but the judge sentenced 
him at the low end of the Guidelines range. Id. at 2461–62. Affirming, the Fourth Circuit held that a 
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Booker review required the application of heightened scrutiny to 
substantial variances from the Guidelines.
87
 Again, the Supreme Court 
stepped in to offer its guidance to the divided circuits. The Court held that 
the proportionality test was unlawful and that all sentences should be 
reviewed under an ―abuse of discretion standard‖ that deferred to the 
superior institutional capacity of the district courts.
88
  
Some judges utilized their newfound freedom under the advisory 
regime to express, via sentencing, their political and social criticisms of 
particular Guidelines.
89
 This conduct was particularly pronounced within 
the crack cocaine context, which was an obvious target for application of 
judicial discretion because it had long been a subject of popular and 
judicial unrest.
90
 Critics of the powder-versus-crack cocaine sentencing 
disparity hoped this moment would provide an opportunity to erode the 
judicial commitment to the 100:1 ratio.
91
 Critics thought that, perhaps, 
now sentencing judges would have the autonomy to reconsider and deviate 
from the 100:1 formula they found to be so misguided. And this is what 
some district courts did in the crack cases that came before them—they 
began issuing sentences below the range prescribed by the Guidelines, 
 
 
sentence that falls within a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 
2462. Ultimately, the Supreme Court permitted this presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 2462. 
 87. Most circuits applied a ―proportionality test‖ premised on the notion that the further a 
sentencing court deviated from the Guidelines range, the greater the circumstantial justification they 
must have. Harrison, supra note 10, at 1131–32. The Second Circuit, however, abstained from 
application of this test. Id. at 1132. 
 88. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007). Petitioner, Gall, pled guilty to 
participating in a conspiracy to distribute ecstasy, an enterprise he admitted to being involved with for 
seven months during college. Id. at 592. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court‘s lenient 
sentence because they found it was not sufficiently supported by extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 
594. The Supreme Court held that courts of appeals must review all sentences for abuse of discretion, 
reasoning that because the Guidelines are now advisory, appellate review of sentencing decisions 
should be limited. Id. at 594, 596. 
 89. ―After Booker, some district courts began to filter some of these criticisms [of the crack 
cocaine 100:1 quantity sentencing ratio] into their sentencing decisions because they were suddenly 
free to vary from the crack Guidelines when the Guidelines conflicted with § 3553‘s call for sentences 
no greater than necessary to effect fair punishment.‖ Harrison, supra note 10, at 1134; see also 
Wheatley, supra note 49, at 219 (―With the Federal Sentencing Guidelines labeled advisory, district 
courts have taken advantage of their new freedom to go outside the once mandatory sentencing ranges. 
Their judicial discretion no longer shackled to the Guidelines, many federal judges have gone as far as 
rejecting the Guidelines‘ sentencing range outright.‖). 
 90. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also Wheatley, supra note 49, at 219 
(―Particularly under attack, once again, is the harsh treatment of crack offenses in relation to offenses 
involving its sister drug, cocaine.‖). 
 91. See Recent Case, Criminal Law—Federal Sentencing Guidelines—Eighth Circuit Holds That 
District Court Cannot Reduce Sentence Based on Categorical Disagreement with 100:1 Powder/Crack 
Cocaine Quantity Ratio, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2004, 2004–05 (2007). 
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based on disagreement with the Guidelines rather than the presence of 
mitigating facts.
92
  
But on this issue, too, a circuit split occurred; the courts were in 
contention about whether judges could rightfully vary from the Guidelines 
based solely on personal disagreement with the 100:1 ratio.
93
 The majority 
of the circuits took the view that at sentencing, variation from the 
prescribed Guidelines range based solely on disagreement with the 100:1 
ratio was an impermissible usurpation of legislative power.
94
 As the 
Fourth Circuit explained in United States v. Eura, ―Congress has made a 
decision to treat crack cocaine dealers more severely than powder cocaine 
dealers. Congress has also decided to instruct sentencing courts to avoid 
disparate sentences for crack cocaine dealers.‖95 The circuits adopting this 
rhetoric considered their appellate role to be one of policing district courts 
that exceeded their power by denying Congress‘s chosen ―sentencing 
policy embedded in the Guidelines.‖96 But not all of the circuits agreed 
that the courts were bound by Congress‘s imposition of the 100:1 ratio. 
The D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit were aligned in the view that it was 
within the proper discretion of district courts to consider the disparity 
between powder and crack cocaine offenders under the Guidelines.
97
 One 
scholar explained that ―these circuits saw Booker as expanding district 
court discretion to permit deviation from the Guidelines based on policy 
rationales. . . . [B]y implication, it would be improper for a court of 
appeals to reverse the district court for so deviating.‖98 Given this 
 
 
 92. See Harrison, supra note 10, at 1134. 
 93. Id. at 1135. 
 94. See United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2006), where the Second Circuit held: 
[W]hen sentencing a defendant for a crack-related crime—as with any other crime—a district 
court judge may consider ―the judge‘s own sense of what is a fair and just sentence under all 
the circumstances.‖. . . But nothing in Booker suggests that it is the task of district court 
judges to pronounce broad policy choices rather than specific sentences based on the specific 
facts . . . . 
Id. at 356–57. See also United States v. Leatch, 482 F.3d 790, 791 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Johnson, 474 F.3d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1369 (11th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 
633 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 63 (1st Cir. 2006).  
 95. 440 F.3d 625, 633 (4th Cir. 2006).  
 96. See Harrison, supra note 10, at 1135 (citing United States v. Williams, 472 F.3d 835, 839 
(11th Cir. 2006) (Black, J., concurring)). 
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Pickett, 475 F.3d 1347, 1355–56 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2006) (―Post-Booker a sentencing court errs when it believes 
that it has no discretion to consider the crack/powder cocaine differential incorporated in the 
Guidelines . . . as simply advisory . . . . [D]istrict courts may consider the crack/powder cocaine 
differential in the Guidelines as a factor, but not a mandate . . . .‖). 
 98. Harrison, supra note 10, at 1136.  
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meaningful split about the role of district courts in the sentencing of crack 
offenders, the Supreme Court would have to step in and clarify the 
implications of Booker once again.  
II. FEDERAL SENTENCING DOCTRINE REFINED BY KIMBROUGH AND 
SPEARS  
With the circuits in dispute about the extent of discretion afforded to 
sentencing judges and the proper role of the Guidelines following Booker, 
the Supreme Court had little choice but to grant certiorari and give further 
clarity to the confused state of federal sentencing. This is what the Court 
did in Kimbrough v. United States
99
 and Spears v. United States,
100
 two 
cases that addressed the same divisive issue,
101
 Spears merely serving to 
clarify and reiterate the Court‘s important holding in Kimbrough.102 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kimbrough in order to resolve 
the circuit split regarding whether categorical judicial rejection of the 
crack offender Guidelines was permissible.
103
 In doing so, it affirmed the 
minority position espoused by the D.C. and Third Circuits, which allowed 
district courts to consider policy disagreements with the Guidelines in 
their sentencing determinations.
104
 This holding reaffirmed the Court‘s 
previously expressed intention that the Guidelines be purely advisory.
105
  
In Kimbrough, the defendant was charged with possession with intent 
to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, among other 
offenses.
106
 Based on his criminal history level and calculated offense 
 
 
 99. 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007). 
 100. 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009). 
 101. ―Kimbrough and Spears both involved offenders convicted of crack cocaine offenses . . . .‖ 
Gertner, supra note 11, at 272.  
 102. In Spears, the Court explained:  
To the extent the above quoted language [a portion of the Kimbrough decision that the Eighth 
Circuit construed to mean that district courts may not categorically disagree with the 
Guidelines] has obscured Kimbrough‘s holding, we now clarify that district courts are entitled 
to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy 
disagreement with those Guidelines. 
Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 843–44. 
 103. See Harrison, supra note 10, at 1136. 
 104. ―[T]he judge may consider the disparity between the Guidelines‘ treatment of crack and 
powder cocaine offenses.‖ Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564. 
 105. ―[T]he cocaine Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory only . . . .‖ Id.; see also 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (making the Guidelines advisory). 
 106. His offenses included conspiracy to distribute crack and powder cocaine; possession with 
intent to distribute more the 50 grams of crack cocaine; possession with intent to distribute powder 
cocaine; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. United States v. 
Kimbrough, 174 Fed. Appx. 798, 798 (4th Cir. 2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/4
  
 
 
 
 
2010] KIMBROUGH, SPEARS, AND CATEGORICAL REJECTION 491 
 
 
 
 
level, the Guidelines prescribed a sentence ranging between 228 and 270 
months of incarceration.
107
 The sentencing judge rejected this prescription 
as inappropriate, specifically because he found the case to represent the 
―disproportionate and unjust‖ nature of the crack cocaine Guidelines.108 
Based at least in part on his social disapproval of the Guidelines, the judge 
sentenced the defendant to only 180 months of imprisonment.
109
 The 
government appealed and the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court‘s 
sentence, holding that ―a sentence that is outside the guidelines range is 
per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the 
sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses.‖110  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court sided with the district court.
111
 The 
Court‘s opinion relied primarily on an examination of the historical 
treatment of crack-versus-powder cocaine, the characteristic institutional 
role of the Commission, and the way that these two concepts were at 
odds.
112
 After expounding on the Sentencing Commission‘s modern 
denunciation of its own Guideline and reiterating the discretion afforded 
by Booker, the Court professed: 
The crack cocaine . . . Guidelines do not exemplify the 
Commission‘s exercise of its characteristic institutional role . . . . 
Given all this, it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district 
court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the 
crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ―greater than necessary‖ to 
achieve § 3553(a)‘s purposes, even in a mine-run case.113 
The Court intended to dispose of this issue via the Kimbrough decision. 
But the lower courts did not read the case as ending the debate, and they 
 
 
 107. Id. at 798–99. 
 108. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 565 (citing district court decision). Defendant, Derrick Kimbrough, 
was an African American male, and as such he represented the demographic that historically suffered 
disproportionate prosecution and incarceration under the crack offense Guidelines. See Berman, supra 
note 61, at 26.  
 109. Berman, supra note 61, at 25. The judge also based his variance on the ―nature and 
circumstances‖ surrounding the crime and the defendant‘s ―history and characteristics,‖ concluding 
that all of these factors converged to indicate that the prescribed sentence range was not necessary to 
achieve the objectives listed in § 3553(a). Id. 
 110. Kimbrough, 174 Fed. Appx. at 799.  
 111. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 576 (reversing the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanding).  
 112. ―We begin with some background on the different treatment of crack and powder cocaine 
under the federal sentencing laws.‖ Id. at 566. ―The Commission did not use this empirical approach in 
developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking offenses.‖ Id. at 567. ―Although the 
Commission immediately used the 100-to-1 ratio to define base offense levels for all crack and powder 
offenses, it later determined that the crack/powder sentencing disparity is generally unwarranted.‖ Id. 
at 568. 
 113. Id. at 575.  
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failed to reach the proper consensus that categorical rejection is 
permitted.
114
 It became apparent that another decision was required to 
reinforce the rule the Court had attempted to set forth in Kimbrough.
115
 
The Eighth Circuit was one court that failed to properly comprehend the 
Kimbrough holding.
116
 In Spears, the defendant, Stephen Spears, was 
found guilty of conspiracy to distribute both crack and powder cocaine.
117
 
The district court judge found the 100:1 sentencing ratio excessive and 
decided to substitute a 20:1 ratio for the purpose of calculating Spears‘s 
sentence.
118
 On cross appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded 
under the theory that the district court lacked the authority to use a 
substitute ratio in sentencing.
119
 The Supreme Court subsequently vacated 
the Eighth Circuit‘s holding and remanded the case for consideration in 
light of the recently descended Kimbrough decision.
120
 Yet on remand, the 
Eighth Circuit again held that the district court could not ―categorically 
reject‖ the Guidelines ratio.121 The Eighth Circuit based this holding on a 
very conservative construction of Kimbrough, reading the opinion to mean 
that a sentencing judge may not substitute his or her own ratio for the one 
 
 
 114. See United States v. Spears, 533 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also United 
States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 232 n.5 (2008) (noting that in light of Kimbrough, district courts may 
not practice categorical rejection). 
 115. ―[T]he Spears court joined other circuits in their reasoning as well as their results. These 
courts have avoided questioning the 100:1 ratio by asserting that the disparity embodies a 
congressional policy determination that sentencing judges are in no position to challenge.‖ Recent 
Case, supra note 91, at 2007.  
 116. See United States v. Spears, 533 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (―[A] district court 
may not categorically reject the ratio set forth by the Guidelines.‖). 
 117. ―Spears was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base and at 
least 500 grams of powder cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B).‖ 
Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 841 (2009).  
 118. See United States v. Spears, 469 F.3d 1166, 1173–74 (8th Cir. 2006). The total offense level 
based on the drug quantities involved together with Spears‘s criminal history level of IV amounted to a 
Guideline range of 324–405 months‘ incarceration. Under the 20:1 ratio substituted by the sentencing 
judge, the Guideline range was 210 to 262 months‘ incarceration. Ultimately, the judge determined 
that a 240-month sentence was appropriate to impose on Spears. Id. at 1174. In rejecting the 100:1 
ratio and substituting a 20:1 ratio, the court relied on and mimicked United States v. Perry, 389 F. 
Supp. 2d 278 (D.R.I. 2005), which rejected the legality of the 100:1 ratio in light of § 3553 
considerations. Id. at 1173–74. 
 119.  
Just as with any statute, the role of the judiciary is to determine what Congress meant by this 
statutory phrase. . . . A judge‘s personal views regarding the Sentencing Commission‘s 
recommendations cannot supplant Congress‘s refusal to adopt [the Commission‘s repeated 
recommendations to amend the ratio]. . . . The district court erred . . . by granting a downward 
variance based solely on its rejection of the 100:1 . . . ratio.  
Spears, 469 F.3d at 1177–78 (internal quotations omitted). 
 120. Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 842. 
 121. Spears, 533 F.3d at 717. 
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prescribed by the Guidelines, but that ―a sentencing approach based on the 
‗particular circumstances‘ of the defendant‘s case‖ was permitted.122 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to correct the Eighth Circuit‘s holding, 
which was plainly inconsistent with the Court‘s intended rule in 
Kimbrough.
123
 
The Supreme Court‘s opinion in Spears was succinct,124 saying just 
enough to chastise the Eighth Circuit and others who had resisted the 
natural reading of Kimbrough and make clear what the Court thought it 
had already established two years prior. The Court explained, ―Kimbrough 
thus holds that with respect to the crack cocaine Guidelines, a categorical 
disagreement with and variance from the Guidelines is not suspect. That 
was indeed the point of Kimbrough: a recognition of district courts‘ 
authority to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy 
disagreement with them . . . .‖125 After the Court broke down and 
emphasized Kimbrough‘s holding, it went on to explain the dysfunction of 
the alternative outcome under the Eighth Circuit‘s analysis:  
Either district courts would treat the Guidelines‘ policy embodied in 
the crack-to-powder ratio as mandatory, believing that they are not 
entitled to vary based on ―categorical‖ policy disagreements with 
the Guidelines, or they would continue to vary, masking their 
categorical policy disagreements as ―individualized 
determinations.‖ The latter is institutionalized subterfuge. The 
former contradicts our holding in Kimbrough. Neither is an 
acceptable sentencing practice.
126
 
The Supreme Court hoped to align the circuits on the issue of sentencing 
discretion, an issue it considered of enough importance that it essentially 
resolved the same question twice, first in Kimbrough and then again in 
Spears.
127
 As it turned out, however, the influence of the Spears decision 
was not of sufficient firmness and finality to put these questions to rest.  
 
 
 122. Id. at 718 (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 576 (2007)).  
 123. Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 842 (―Because the Eighth Circuit‘s decision on remand conflicts with 
our decision in Kimbrough, we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse.‖). 
 124. The opinion is just eleven pages, including a three-page dissent.  
 125. Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 843.  
 126. Id. at 844. 
 127. The Spears Court explained, ―[b]ecause the Eighth Circuit‘s decision on remand conflicts 
with our decision in Kimbrough, we grant the petition . . . and reverse.‖ 129 S. Ct. at 842. It went on to 
reiterate the holding in Kimbrough, which would be the holding in Spears as well.  
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III. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS ABOUT SENTENCING DISCRETION AND THE 
SCOPE OF KIMBROUGH AND SPEARS 
Despite the Court‘s efforts to institute clear parameters and direct the 
circuits via Kimbrough and Spears, the consequences of these decisions 
are far from obvious, and the circuits continue to split on the meaning of 
these cases.
128
 Significant questions remain that will have meaningful 
consequences for defendants in the federal court system, as well as for the 
future of the Guidelines.  
One of the most important questions left open after Spears is whether 
that holding was driven by, and therefore limited to, the specific, 
controversial factual context of Spears,
129
 or whether it is widely 
applicable. Thus far, the courts remain divided over whether the rule 
derived from Kimbrough and Spears applies outside of the crack cocaine 
context. Initially, the Sixth Circuit declined to put forth a firm holding on 
the issue but suggested that when a controversy required it to do so, it 
would construe the case broadly and furnish wide discretion to district 
court judges to categorically reject the Guidelines.
130
 Later, when forced to 
decide the issue, the Sixth Circuit held, ―our case law makes clear that the 
authority recognized in Kimbrough and Spears applies to all aspects of the 
Guidelines.‖131 The Sixth Circuit seems to base this interpretation on the 
Supreme Court‘s line of cases (perhaps constituting a trend) that 
repeatedly insist on discretion for the district courts and the reduction of 
any remaining pressure the Guidelines may exert.
132
 The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that discretion of this nature is the inherent and inevitable 
consequence of the Booker decision.
133
 Thus far, a handful of other circuits 
that have answered this question have held similarly.
134
 
 
 
 128. See supra Part II and infra notes 129–31, 135–36, 138, 141, 143 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra notes 52, 59 and accompanying text. 
 130.  
[W]e express no opinion on whether the principles articulated in Spears may apply outside of 
the crack-cocaine context to allow district courts to develop categorical alternatives to other 
sentencing enhancements . . . . We note, however, that this Court has generally heeded the 
Supreme Court‘s repeated instructions to afford sentencing judges wide latitude in imposing 
sentences outside the Guidelines . . . .  
United States v. Johnson, 553 F.3d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 2009).  
 131. United States v. Cole, 343 Fed. Appx. 109, 115 (6th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. 
Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 132. See supra note 107. 
 133. See Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 585. 
 134. See United States v. Lente, 323 Fed. Appx. 698, 712–13 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding no 
principled basis for limiting the holding of Kimbrough to the crack cocaine context); see also United 
States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that recent Supreme Court cases teach 
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Yet, there is not a clear consensus that this is the right result, as some 
judges have construed Kimbrough and Spears to the opposite end. In 
United States v. Vandewege, while concurring in the judgment, Circuit 
Judge Julia Smith Gibbons argued that ―[n]either Kimbrough or Spears 
authorized district courts to categorically reject the policy judgments of the 
Sentencing Commission in areas outside the crack-cocaine offenses 
. . . .‖135 Others, too, have read the language of these cases narrowly and 
literally, to the effect of limiting the privilege to categorically reject the 
Guidelines to the crack cocaine context.
136
 Proponents of various 
Guidelines-driven enhancements or prescriptions are concerned, but 
uncertain, about whether Kimbrough and Spears will permit judicial 
deviation from a particular Guideline because of the judge‘s personal 
disagreement with the policy.
137
 
Another possible construction of Kimbrough and Spears that the 
opinions neither directly endorse nor preclude is that categorical rejection 
of a Guideline is permissible only if it was not enacted within the 
characteristic institutional role of the Commission.
138
 Alternatively, 
perhaps this consideration merely dictates the level of appellate deference 
to a district court‘s decision to categorically reject the Guidelines. This 
interpretation would encompass the crack cocaine context, but would also 
leave room in the law for the permissible rejection of any other 
Guidelines
139
 that were enacted outside of the Commission‘s distinct 
institutional role.
140
  
In Herrera-Zuniga, the Sixth Circuit held that ―a categorical, policy-
based rejection of the Guidelines, even though entitled to ‗less respect,‘ 
 
 
that categorical rejection does not render a sentence unreasonable; sentences based on categorical 
factors are permitted). 
 135. United States v. Vandewege, 561 F.3d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 2009) (Gibbons, J., concurring).  
 136. See United States v. Crawford, 520 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that when 
powder and crack cocaine Guideline disparity does not directly affect the calculation of defendant‘s 
sentence, Kimbrough is inapplicable).  
 137. Timothy McGrath is concerned that the bankruptcy fraud enhancement found in the 
Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1(b)(8)(B) may now be subject to categorical rejection and hence 
neutralization under the post-Spears sentencing regime. He argues that this would be unfortunate since 
this Guideline is socially desirable and was enacted within the ambit of the Commission‘s 
characteristic institutional role. McGrath, supra note 29, at 59. 
 138. See United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1100 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (―Even before 
Spears, numerous district courts had read Kimbrough to permit a sentencing court to give little 
deference to the guideline for child pornography cases on the ground that the guideline did not 
exemplify the Sentencing Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role and empirical 
analysis, but was the result of congressional mandates . . . .‖). 
 139. Consider, for example, the child pornography Guideline mentioned supra note 138; see also 
infra note 145 for greater explanation.  
 140. See supra notes 47, 48 and accompanying text. 
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nevertheless is permissible where the guidelines in question ‗do not 
exemplify the Commission‘s exercise of its characteristic institutional 
role.‘‖141 Yet the court refused to fully commit to this interpretation of 
Kimbrough and Spears, leaving itself a loophole when it went on to say, 
―this may not be the only circumstance in which sentencing courts are 
authorized to reject the Guidelines on policy grounds . . . .‖142 The Eighth 
Circuit has been similarly noncommittal, observing that ―[t]he Court has 
been equivocal about whether a sentencing court owes greater deference to 
guidelines that do exemplify this ‗characteristic institutional role,‘ and 
whether closer appellate review is warranted with respect to variances 
from such guidelines.‖143 
In a case before the Third Circuit in which a defendant was convicted 
for a child pornography offense, the defendant argued for the application 
of this line of reasoning.
144
 The defendant analogized the child 
pornography Guideline to the crack cocaine Guideline, contending that 
because it was not established pursuant to the Commission‘s institutional 
role,
145
 reliance on the Guideline was an abuse of district court 
discretion.
146
 The Court dismissed this claim, simply stating that ―[c]ase 
law does not support [defendant‘s] argument . . . .‖147 But it is not obvious 
what the court meant by this unelaborated comment. Perhaps the court was 
merely rejecting the suggestion that district courts abuse their discretion 
by relying on noncharacteristic Guidelines,
148
 for this is a bold reading of 
 
 
 141. 571 F.3d 568, 586 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 
(2007)); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that a 
Guideline which failed to represent the Commission‘s characteristic institutional role deserved less 
deference than a Guideline that did represent the characteristic role).  
 142. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 586. 
 143. United States v. Barron, 557 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2009).  
 144. United States v. Velazquez, 329 Fed. Appx. 365, 367 (3d Cir. 2009). The Velazquez 
defendant argued that the child pornography guidelines ―deserve little or no deference because they are 
not empirically based.‖ Id. The defendant was the target of an FBI child pornography investigation and 
was convicted for using interstate commerce to attempt to persuade, entice, and induce a minor to 
engage in illegal sexual acts, as well as for the receipt of child pornography. Id. The defendant had 
targeted the ―girl‖ in a Yahoo! chat room, transmitted nude photographs of himself and children to her, 
and arranged for her to travel from Pennsylvania to Mississippi to have sex with him. Id.  
 145. The Guideline relating to child pornography was not enacted pursuant to empirical research. 
Instead it was established by Congress through the PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 
(2003), which targeted child pornographers for more severe punishment by augmenting mandatory 
minimums and maximums, increasing base offense levels under the Guidelines and adding 
enhancements for particular exacerbating facts. Velazquez, 329 Fed. Appx. at 369.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Most courts would agree with the Eighth Circuit, which stated, ―Kimbrough and Spears do 
not hold that a district court must disagree with any sentencing guideline, whether it reflects a policy 
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the case law indeed. The Third Circuit did not divulge, however, whether 
it believed that a district court may choose to reject a noncharacteristic 
Guideline.  
Scholars, too, have pointed to ―the characteristic institutional role‖ as a 
potential distinguishing factor for Guidelines that may be categorically 
rejected.
149
 One scholar from the Bankruptcy Institute pondered, ―When 
the Commission crafted the bankruptcy fraud enhancement . . . it was 
exercising its ‗characteristic institutional role.‘ . . . Is the district judge‘s 
decision reasonable, or is it entitled to ‗less respect‘ since it infringes on 
the Commission‘s characteristic institutional role?‖150 Perhaps a judge‘s 
discretion to categorically reject a Guideline hinges on whether such 
Guideline was enacted pursuant to the Commission‘s characteristic 
institutional role.
151
  
Some courts have taken an alternative approach to distinguishing 
which Guidelines may be categorically rejected, finding certain Guidelines 
ineligible for categorical rejection under Kimbrough and Spears because 
they originated from a statute instead of the Sentencing Commission. In 
United States v. Harris, the Seventh Circuit held that ―a sentence entered 
under the career offender guideline, § 4B1.1, raises no Kimbrough 
problem because to the extent it treats crack cocaine differently from 
powder cocaine, the disparity arises from a statute, not from the advisory 
guidelines.‖152 The court arrived at this conclusion by reasoning that 
§ 4B1.1 was statutorily conceived
153
 and that ―[w]hile the sentencing 
guidelines may be only advisory for district judges, congressional 
legislation is not.‖154 Other courts have subscribed to this reasoning as 
well, effectively curtailing the reach of Kimbrough and Spears. For 
example, when faced with its own career offender Guideline case, the First 
Circuit explained, ―Kimbrough—though doubtless important for some 
cases—is of only academic interest here.‖155  
 
 
judgment of Congress or the Commission‘s ‗characteristic‘ empirical approach.‖ Barron, 557 F.3d at 
871.  
 149. McGrath, supra note 29, at 59.  
 150. Id. 
 151. See supra note 137 and accompanying text for case law that offers a basis for arguing that the 
right to categorically reject hinges upon whether a guideline was enacted within the characteristic role 
of the Commission.  
 152. 536 F.3d 798, 813 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 153. ―[Section] 4B1.1 correlates offense levels and sentencing ranges with the gravity of the crime 
by incorporating the statutory maximum sentence for the underlying offense.‖ Id. at 812. 
 154. Id. at 813.  
 155. United States v. Jimenez, 512 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
498 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:475 
 
 
 
 
The Sixth Circuit stands in contradiction of the Seventh and First 
Circuits. In United States v. Cole, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the split 
but firmly held that ―our case law makes clear that the authority 
recognized in Kimbrough and Spears applies to all aspects of the 
Guidelines.‖156 Given this broad construction of the cases, the Sixth 
Circuit held that district courts have the discretion to reject the career-
offender enhancement under USSG § 4B1.1, despite its statutory 
origination.
157
 To the Sixth Circuit, all Guidelines are rightfully vulnerable 
to rejection in the wake of Kimbrough and Spears,
158
 and the searching 
distinctions implemented by its sister circuits are unwarranted given this 
basic fact.  
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As this Note has discussed, during the last few decades, the ideological 
pendulum has vacillated on the very sensitive and important issue of 
federal sentencing policy.
159
 First, it swung away from the indeterminate 
sentencing regime in place prior to the birth of the Sentencing Guidelines 
and toward a more predictable and uniform mandatory sentencing 
regime.
160
 Now the pendulum is in the process of swinging back, this time 
away from the mandatory regime and toward a more unpredictable, 
discretion-driven system.
161
 Ideally, the pendulum should settle 
somewhere in the middle of these two camps and remain there. When the 
issue is no longer in flux, a federal sentencing regime can finally establish 
longevity and stability, thereby providing desirable systemic predictability 
and consistency.  
The spirit of the Kimbrough and Spears opinions,
162
 as well as a 
broader view of the recent case law in this area,
163
 suggests that the Sixth 
Circuit got the Supreme Court‘s intent correct when it held that categorical 
 
 
 156. United States v. Cole, 343 Fed. Appx. 109, 115 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 157. Id. at 115–16. 
 158. Id. 
 159. ―The last three decades witnessed a revolution in sentencing and corrections practice. . . . 
During this same period, the federal government and many states embarked on a course of procedural 
innovation.‖ Bowman, supra note 8, at 1317. 
 160. See supra notes 8, 9 and accompanying text.  
 161. See supra notes 102, 104, 105. 
 162. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007) ( ―[T]he cocaine Guidelines, like 
all other Guidelines, are advisory only . . . .‖) (emphasis added). The Spears opinion reemphasizes this 
broad language in affirming Kimbrough. Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 842 (2009).  
 163. Since 2000, the Supreme Court has addressed issues of federal sentencing in Apprendi, 
Booker, Rita, Gall, Kimbrough, and Spears, each time deciding in favor of judicial discretion in 
sentencing.  
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rejection of the Guidelines is not to be strictly limited to the crack cocaine 
context.
164
 As the Sixth Circuit observed, the Supreme Court seems to 
intend that the potentiality of categorical rejection be widely applicable.
165
 
The Supreme Court‘s wisdom in detecting a legal problem with purely 
mandatory sentencing is sound.
166
 Its solution, however, to free judges 
from all meaningful ties to the Guidelines in favor of broad discretionary 
power, is less well founded.  
A. Categorical Rejections Should Only Be Permissible For Guidelines 
Enacted Outside of the Commission’s Institutional Role 
The Commission and the Guidelines derive their legitimacy from their 
characteristic institutional role.
167
 This role is what distinguishes Guideline 
prescriptions from the inclinations of various judges, and it is what entitles 
the Guidelines to their powerful place in the sentencing process. Thus, 
Guidelines that were enacted pursuant to this role should not be eligible 
for categorical rejection.
168
 Guidelines that have not been instituted 
pursuant to the Commission‘s characteristic institutional role, however, 
should be vulnerable to categorical rejection.
169
 For these Guidelines can 
claim no greater wisdom or superior status than the individually designed 
sentences that are produced by federal judges daily. 
The structure of the Guidelines already permits deviations from the 
prescribed ranges for nearly all imaginable mitigating factors.
170
 
Consequently, any categorical rejection is bound to be based on the 
 
 
 164. United States v. Cole, 343 Fed. Appx. 109, 115 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 165. See supra notes 131, 132 and accompanying text.  
 166. In Booker, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of all facts 
relevant to sentencing was unconstitutionally contravened by mandatory sentencing. See United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 167. See supra notes 23, 24.  
 168. This is the obvious inverse of the Court‘s holding in Kimbrough that the district court‘s 
rejection of the guideline was permissible ―because those Guidelines do not exemplify the 
Commission‘s exercise of its characteristic institutional role.‖ Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 
558, 575 (2007); see United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 2008) (Guidelines 
schemes that do not ―‗exemplify the [Sentencing] Commission‘s exercise of its characteristic 
institutional role‘ . . . deserve less deference . . . .‖ (citation omitted)).  
 169. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.  
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2008) (―The court, in determining the particular sentence to be 
imposed, shall consider—(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant‖); see also Unites States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(courts are required to provide defendants ―opportunity to draw the judge‘s attention to any factor 
listed in section 3553(a) that might warrant a sentence different from the guidelines sentence‖). ―The 
Guidelines address, in one way or another virtually all of the factors that lawyers and sentencing 
judges have thought relevant to imposing sentences.‖ Bowman, supra note 8, at 1346.  
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political or moral sensibilities of the individual sentencing judge. But 
when a Guideline has been properly promulgated, the political sensibilities 
of an individual judge should not trump the institutionally established and 
agreed-upon prescription. This limitation on categorical rejection is 
particularly salient when one considers the heavy cost that such rejection 
will have on the criminal justice system by way of creating serious 
disparities and concentrating excessive power in the hands of unelected 
federal judges.
171
  
On the other hand, when a Guideline lacks an empirical, institutional 
underpinning, it is much more likely to be ill founded.
172
 In this scenario, 
the risk of sentencing disparities and judicial overreach is justified by the 
good that may come of permitting judges to categorically reject 
Guidelines.
173
 Through categorical rejection in this scenario only, judges 
may serve individual justice better and remedy the injustices of bad 
Guidelines. Additionally, they may attract necessary social and political 
attention to individual Guidelines that are unjust or socially undesirable.
174
 
Even if categorical rejection were to be contained to the limited realm 
of non-empirically originated Guidelines, a still greater level of systemic 
judicial discipline must be instituted in order to ensure judicial 
accountability. This is necessary in order to minimize judges‘ inclinations 
to categorically reject and instead reserve this occurrence for only the most 
necessary instances. Encouraging judges to practice categorical rejection 
sparingly will have the desirable effect of minimizing problematic 
disparities in sentences between courts and regions.
175
 The implementation 
 
 
 171. A system with prevalent categorical rejection could be likened to the pre-Guidelines era in 
which trial court judges had nearly limitless discretion. This scheme ―came under scrutiny because it 
produced widespread disparity, with similarly situated defendants often sentenced by different district 
courts to widely varying terms of imprisonment.‖ Harrison, supra note 10, at 1120. The flaws of this 
system were so troublesome that Congress was prompted to pass the Sentencing Reform Act to curtail 
extreme judicial power and reduce unfair disparities. Id. 
 172. This is illustrated by the improper enactment of the crack cocaine Guideline. See supra notes 
56–59 and accompanying text.  
 173. Perhaps we have seen the crack cocaine Guideline rejections illustrate this principle.  
 174. ―The Commission is . . . obsessed with monitoring judicial compliance with the Guidelines.‖ 
Gertner, supra note 11, at 279. 
 175. For an example of how problematic such disparities can be, consider the situation created by 
Kimbrough and Spears. Pursuant to these cases, federal judges have the green light to substitute their 
own powder-to-crack cocaine ratios upon rejection of the Guidelines ratio. The practical consequence 
is that some defendants are now arbitrarily sentenced under a 20:1 ratio, whereas other defendants who 
come before a different court are sentenced for the same crime under the orthodox 100:1 ratio. Klein & 
Thompson, supra note 36, at 548; see also United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 644 (N.D. 
Iowa 2009) (applying a 1:1 ratio).  
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of systemic safeguards could also encourage the potential positive effects 
of categorical rejection,
176
 not just mitigate the negative effects.  
B. Judges Should Be Required to Write Sentencing Opinions When They 
Categorically Reject a Guideline and Materially Change a Defendant’s 
Sentence 
The legitimacy of the sentencing system would be advanced if judges 
were required to write sentencing opinions any time they categorically 
rejected a Guideline and a material change in a defendant‘s sentence 
resulted.
177
 Currently, judges rarely write any form of sentencing 
opinion.
178
 Judges are only subject to § 3553(c)‘s ―statement of reasons‖ 
provision,
179
 which requires a minimal verbal statement of how the judge 
arrived at the sentence
180
 and the completion of a sparse, perfunctory 
form.
181
 A sentencing opinion requirement would discourage judges from 
rejecting Guidelines except in the most compelling cases, due to the 
increased burden on their time and energy that would necessarily 
accompany rejection.  
Such a requirement would also ensure that a judge‘s ideological stance 
was documented in a publicly accessible way so that the judge could be 
held accountable for his or her views and chosen course of activism. The 
public could consider how and when judges are applying their discretion, 
perhaps exerting the influence of popular opinion on either the judges 
themselves or those involved in appointing future federal judges.
182
 In 
 
 
 176. The positive effects of categorical rejection include focusing public attention on poorly 
conceived Guidelines and prompting debate that might precipitate reform of such Guidelines. 
 177. ―Full written opinions . . . may provide the best source of commentary on the sentencing 
rules selected by a commission, and offer the best hope for further refinement, revision and reform.‖ 
Marc Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough: The Need for Written Sentencing Opinions, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & 
L. 3, 4 (1989). 
 178. See Gertner, supra note 11, at 278. 
 179. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006) (―The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court 
the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence . . . .‖). 
 180. See United States v. Rodriguez-Alvarez, 425 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 2005) (construing 
§ 3553(c) loosely to find that it does not require a judge to discuss sentencing factors in detail or make 
explicit findings on or assign weight to the mitigating factors a defendant put forth). 
 181.  
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (―AO‖) has created an anemic form ostensibly 
in an effort to comply with [the statement of reason] requirement . . . . [T]his document 
contains a parade of nearly meaningless check boxes . . . . Compounding the injury, the AO 
prevents the public from seeing . . . these insipid documents, just as it refuses to release all 
judge-specific information about sentences. 
Steven L. Chanenson, Write On!, 115 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 146, 147 (2006). 
 182. ―Congress and the public might have a better understanding of and respect for the judicial 
role if they were able to read an opinion describing why a judge imposed a sentence . . . .‖ Id. 
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addition to giving the public a window into the courtroom, sentencing 
opinions would apprise fellow judges of their colleagues‘ sentencing 
activities. As one author said, ―in order to avoid inter-judge disparities, 
judges must be able to see the decisions made in the courtroom next 
door.‖183 Sentencing opinions would surely increase awareness of how 
fellow judges conduct sentencing and might even elevate the general 
quality of sentencing practice by encouraging greater debate and 
camaraderie within the judicial field.
184
 
Currently, sentencing materials are rarely accessible to judges, not to 
mention the American public.
185
 But with the recent growth in judicial 
power stemming from the Booker and Spears line of cases, increased 
judicial accountability should be required as well. Accountability could be 
achieved by requiring judges to produce publicly accessible sentencing 
opinions each time they choose to categorically reject a Guideline in the 
process of sentencing a defendant. 
Sentencing opinions would also be instrumental in maintaining an 
appearance of fairness for both defendants and the community at large.
186
 
Amid the sentencing disparities that are introduced into the system by 
categorical rejection, defendants, particularly those who are unfamiliar 
with the constitutional underpinnings of the current level of judicial 
discretion, might feel that they are victims of an arbitrary system or the 
whims of a particular judge.
187
 Requiring sentencing opinions would make 
the sentencing process more transparent. It would provide defendants with 
an explanation of why their sentence did not conform with what they 
might consider to be criminal justice norms. And as the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged, a ―defendant has a legitimate interest in the character 
of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may 
have no right to object to a particular result of the sentencing process.‖188 
Thus, sentencing opinions will help satisfy defendants and the general 
 
 
(emphasis added). 
 183. Gertner, supra note 11, at 279.  
 184. ―[W]ell-reasoned sentencing opinions and judicial transparency concerning sentencing are 
two of the best weapons judges have to bolster their legitimacy and preserve their decisional 
independence.‖ Chanenson, supra note 181, at 148. 
 185. See Gertner, supra note 11, at 278. ―[S]entencing decisions . . . are rarely publicly available, 
searchable, or otherwise accessible to judges and advocates.‖ Id. 
 186. See Chanenson, supra note 181, at 147. 
 187. Case law shows a plethora of evidence that defendants have often felt this way, even when 
they were sentenced within the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Alvarez, 425 F.3d 
1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendant claimed his sentence was unfair because the court did not make 
clear to him its findings on the mitigating factors he had presented at sentencing). 
 188. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). 
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public that deviations from the Sentencing Guidelines are well founded 
and not arbitrary or a result of bias. Ultimately, this will protect the 
perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
189
 
C. Reform Should be Instituted Within the Sentencing Commission 
While requiring sentencing opinions would be a positive step in 
counteracting the sentencing problems growing out of the Spears and 
Kimbrough rulings, it is not enough. Reform must also take place within 
the Sentencing Commission itself. The Commission has historically spent 
a great deal of resources tracking compliance with the Guidelines.
190
 Now 
that mere compliance is not essential because sentencing is no longer 
mandatory, the Commission should turn its attention and resources to 
which Guidelines are categorically rejected and why.
191
  
A congressional directive would be the most direct way to restructure 
the Commission and review which Guidelines are categorically rejected by 
judges.
192
 Such review would allow the Commission to identify the 
consensus about which Guidelines have been improperly enacted outside 
of the Commission‘s institutional role. Having identified these Guidelines, 
the Commission could revisit them, with the end goal of eradicating or 
replacing those Guidelines that lack an empirical justification.
193
 The 
Commission is in the best position to offer such redress if judges are 
properly rejecting uncharacteristic Guidelines.  
By tracking categorical rejections and exploring their underpinnings, 
the Commission can also draw attention to the Guidelines that are 
improperly rejected. They can do so by publishing reports that raise 
awareness about improper rejections,
194
 explaining why the disputed 
 
 
 189. ―It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose 
the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.‖ Id. This 
principle can surely be applied more broadly to a wide range of criminal penalties or loss of liberty.  
 190. ―The United States Sentencing Commission has extraordinary resources. . . . Aside from 
congressional directives, the Commission is also obsessed with monitoring judicial compliance with 
the Guidelines. It closely tracks whether judges are following the Guidelines . . . .‖ Gertner, supra note 
11, at 279. 
 191. ―Today, the Commission should be focused on why judges depart . . . . In so doing, the 
Commission will uncover patterns in departures and be able to better guide judges in the use of their 
Booker discretion.‖ Id. at 280. 
 192. Congress frequently suggests action to the Commission via directive. Orrin G. Hatch, The 
Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
185, 196 (1993). 
 193. See supra note 24. 
 194. As a matter of business, the Commission frequently publishes reports on different subjects 
relevant to federal crime and sentencing. To view the Commission‘s myriad reports, visit UNITED 
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Guideline is, in fact, legitimate. Hopefully this would exert enough 
pressure to curtail improper rejections. If the Commission takes up these 
new tasks, it will make the sentencing system stronger, both by guiding 
judges to better results
195
 and by eliminating a major source of criticism 
from which the Sentencing Guidelines suffer.  
Taken together, the suggested reforms would ultimately eliminate 
reasons for categorical rejection,
196
 thereby reducing the need for 
unfettered discretion and the consequent disparities it causes. This kind of 
evaluation, reflection, and reform is central to the Commission‘s designed 
role.
197
 Its originators intended that the Commission would engage in an 
ongoing process of data gathering and reevaluation of the Guidelines.
198
 
Appropriately, in making the suggested reforms now, the Commission will 
satisfy Congress‘s original vision, while adapting to the demands of 
contemporary times—the hallmarks of a lasting institution.  
D. Feasibility of Policy Recommendations 
The first prong of the policy recommendation, that categorical rejection 
be limited to those Guidelines that were not enacted pursuant to the 
Commission‘s institutional role,199 is unlikely to come to fruition. While 
this Note has argued that this limitation would be ideal due to its 
likelihood of producing optimal social outcomes, the Supreme Court has 
tended toward an alternative, more broad construction of the law.
200
 If the 
circuits cannot come to a proper consensus, another Supreme Court 
opinion may be required to establish a final answer to the questions 
concerning the scope of judges‘ rights to categorically reject Guidelines. 
Although another Supreme Court opinion may explicitly limit the practice 
of categorical rejection to Guidelines that were enacted outside the 
characteristic institutional role, this seems unlikely. 
The second suggestion, that judges should be required to publish 
widely accessible sentencing opinions,
201
 is possible regardless of how the 
Supreme Court might decide the scope of categorical rejection. This rule 
 
 
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
 195. See Gertner, supra note 11, at 280.  
 196. The need for categorical rejection would be eradicated by the Commission reforming or 
eliminating those Guidelines that were enacted outside of the characteristic institutional role. Once all 
improperly enacted Guidelines are eliminated, judges should no longer engage in categorical rejection.  
 197. See supra note 24. 
 198. See supra note 24. 
 199. See supra Part IV.A.  
 200. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.  
 201. See supra Part IV.B.  
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might meet resistance from some members of the judicial community due 
to the increased burden it would generate and the publicity it is bound to 
bring to the judicial realm. But if enough political support could be rallied, 
Congress, or even the Commission, could mandate that judges write 
sentencing opinions in the case of categorical rejections. If the 
Commission sought to enact a rule of this nature, however, questions 
might arise as to whether it is mandatory, or merely advisory, like the rest 
of the Guidelines post-Booker.  
The final suggestion, that the Commission should assume 
responsibility for gathering and analyzing data about which Guidelines are 
suffering categorical rejection, is the most likely suggestion to be 
implemented.
202
 This action would require little real reform within the 
Commission, for the Commission was intended from its inception to 
frequently adapt to emerging data and revise the Guidelines.
203
 For the 
Commission to allot time and resources to the study of categorically 
rejected Guidelines will, at this juncture, merely preserve the 
Commission‘s proper role. What is more, this action would strengthen the 
Commission‘s institutional legitimacy by remedying past errors for which 
it has suffered criticism and by eradicating or modifying Guidelines that 
were improper from inception.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Kimbrough and Spears are the latest developments in the Court‘s 
longstanding struggle to institute a federal sentencing scheme that 
achieves a harmony of individual justice, systemic predictability, and 
efficiency. The Court‘s decision to permit categorical rejection of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, while currently unclear in its scope, certainly 
perpetuates the trend toward greater judicial discretion. Judicial discretion, 
while sometimes essential to achieve individual justice, comes at the cost 
of sentencing disparities and general unpredictability in sentencing. 
Disparities and unpredictability are bound to encourage a public 
perception of unfairness in federal sentencing, and in so doing, they 
undermine the perceived legitimacy of the federal criminal justice system. 
In the worst-case scenario, that perception of unfairness will not be a 
misunderstanding, but a functional reality. 
The suggested institutional safeguards would be time consuming and 
costly to administer. Simply disallowing categorical rejection of all 
 
 
 202. See supra Part IV.C. 
 203. See supra notes 6, 37, 38 and accompanying text.  
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Guidelines would be a more efficient sentencing policy. Likewise, 
allowing categorical rejection of all Guidelines would raise fewer 
questions about reform within the Sentencing Commission and would 
generate less friction with federal judges. But our federal justice system is 
not one that prioritizes ease. To the contrary, the system frequently 
negotiates fine boundaries and complex analyses in order to achieve the 
competing values of systemic efficiency and individual justice. Limiting 
categorical rejection of the Sentencing Guidelines to improperly enacted 
Guidelines and requiring that judges compose public sentencing opinions 
in the case of categorical rejection would achieve the ideal balance 
between judicial discretion and the goal of systemic predictability. 
Meanwhile, the Sentencing Commission should seek to improve the 
integrity of the Guidelines so that such discretion is not necessary to arrive 
at a just result.  
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